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Joint Control by the Surety:
A Virginia Statute and Its Common Law Ancestry
D. Oxvn.fE LAXY
It happened in Texas, but it could just as well have been
Virginia. At the June 1934 term of the County Court of An-
derson County, Texas, there was offered for probate the holo-
graphic will of Herman Oberweiss. The testator and his
several brothers had settled in Texas after emigrating from
their native Germany, and without benefit of much education
Herman Oberweiss had been able to accumulate considerable
wealth during his lifetime. Although the will provided that
his wife should receive substantially the entire estate, a
significant clause in the Oberweiss testamentary document
was fashioned in these words:
"I want it that mine brother Adolph be my executer
and i want it that the Judge should please make Adolph
plenty bond put up and watch him like hell. Adolph is
a good bisness man but only a dumpph would trust him
with a busted pfennig."
What provisions of the law would enable a court to make
Adolph "plenty bond put up" when he qualified as executor
of his brother's estate, and how would it be legally possible
to "watch him like hell" in keeping with the testator's ex-
press mandate?
If the will of Herman Oberweiss had been admitted to pro-
bate in Virginia, the court could require Adolph tp provide
a surety bond in a penalty at least equal to the full value of
the testator's personal estate, and if the estate included
real property which Adolph was authorized to sell or on
which he was to receive rents and profits, the court could
require of him a bond equal to the full value not only of the
personal estate but also of the real estate, rents and profits.
Va. Code Ann. §64-116 (1950). It seems obvious, therefore,
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that in Virginia Adolph could be required to "plenty bond
put up" when he qualified as executor of Herman's estate.
However, "to watch him like hell" in his administration of
the estate is a function that would necessarily have to be
performed, if at all, by Adolph's surety and not by the court.
Indeed, this function under the English common law in the
form of joint control by the surety was quite impossible on
the ground that it was contrary to public policy long estab-
lished in the administration of estates.
Such bonds as would be required of Adolph are, in ever-
increasing numbers, provided by one of the many corporate
surety companies duly licensed to transact the business of
corporate suretyship within the state. Less frequently, but
more often than the average lawyer might think, the corporate
surety executes its bond on the condition that it will exercise
joint control along with the fiduciary over either the corpus
of the estate, the income of the estate, or both. In Virginia,
such a condition is legally enforceable and the actual joint
control is legally possible. The statutory justification for joint
control by the surety is contained in §38.1-645 of the Virginia
Code (1950), a section of the statutory laws of Virginia that
is buried deep in the insurance statutes and is somewhat
difficult to locate because of a rather awkward method of
indexing. It is this statute, enacted into law by the General
Assembly of Virginia in 1942, that would enable the surety
on Adolph's bond to "watch him like hell" and thus fulfill
the testator's obvious intent. Why is there such a statute?
11lhat is its historical background in the common law?
Joint control by the surety had its judicial introduction in
England in August, 1820, when Richard White was appointed
by the English High Court of Chancery as receiver of the
estate of John Salway, a requirement of his appointment
being that two sureties execute bond in his behalf in the
amount of eight thousand pounds, conditioned upon his faith-
ful performance of duty as receiver. Subsequent to his qualifi-
cation, White enlisted the aid of Frances Jenks Burlton and
William Adams and prevailed upon them to become individual
co-sureties on his bond. They consented, but subject only to
an, agreement that was hitherto unknown and singularly
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unique. This agreement, to which White became a party, was
to the effect that one Anderson, a business partner of co-
surety Adams, should have the incoming estate funds paid
over to him to be deposited in a designated bank (Prodgers
and Company, bankers) in the names of the sureties, Adams
and Burlton, and that no money should be withdrawn from
this account except by drafts written by Anderson and signed
by White, as receiver. The bond was executed and White
proceeded with the receivership duties of the Saway estate.
There followed the financial panic of 1824-1826 during which
Prodgers and Company (bankers) became bankrupt in De-
cember, 1824, with loss of considerable Salway estate funds.
A new receivership account was then opened in the names of
Adams and Burlton (sureties) with Coleman and Morris
(bankers), subject to the same joint control exercised by
Anderson, not himself a surety for White (receiver), but a
business partner of Adams (co-surety). This bank (Coleman
and Morris) failed in April 1826, with further loss to the
Salway estate. Thereupon, the executors of the Salway estate
brought suit, the object of their petition in Chancery being
to charge White as receiver, and his sureties (Adams and
Burlton), with the loss occasioned by the successive failure
of two banks, with whom the receivership funds had been
deposited. Their grounds for complaint were founded on an
alleged breach of duty by the receiver, that he had dealt
improperly with the estate money by putting it under the
control of other persons. Salway v. Salway, 4 Russ. Ch. 60, 38
Eng. Rep. 727 (1820).
The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Leach, wrote an ad-
mirable opinion in that case which, had it not been reversed
on appeal, might have charted an entirely opposite course for
the next hundred year's history of joint control by the surety.
The Master reasoned that if White, as receiver, had so placed
the receivership funds under the control of other persons in a
imanner exposing those funds to loss or prejudice by the con-
duct of such other persons, he and his sureties might be held
responsible for the loss. However, he continued, the Salway
funds were never under the sole control of Adams and Burl-
ton, sureties, nor were they exposed to loss or prejudice by
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being deposited in their names. Since the bankers could pay
drafts only when signed by the receiver, White, the funds
could not be applied by the sureties to any foreign purposes,
nor could said funds have been deemed the property of the
sureties in the event of their own insolvency. Sir John con-
cluded that the precautions used were intended to secure the
application of the funds by White to receivership purposes
only and as such were beneficial and not injurious to the trust
estate. Thus the Master of the Rolls found the receiver and
his sureties not liable for the loss of estate funds sustained
through the failure of two bank depositories.
A petition of appeal from the decision of the Master of
the Rolls was then presented to the High Court of Chancery
by the Salway estate executors and came on for hearing on
February 8, 1831 before Lord Chancellor Brougham. The sole
issue was whether or not the receiver himself, and in default
by him, his sureties, should be made liable for the receivership
funds lost through the consecutive failure of two banking
institutions. The Lord Chancellor reached his decision and
delivered the opinion the following day, February 9, 1831,
from which degree of haste a lack of thoughtful consideration
seems more than obvious. Indeed, when endeavoring to
sustain his reversal of the Master of the Rolls on later final
appeal before the House of Lords, Lord Chancellor Brougham
made the astute observation that his opinion below was
affected by the pressure of business at the time, resulting
in his inability to adopt a plan he always pursued-that of
writing his judgments at length. White v. Baugh, 3 Cl. and F.
44, 6 Eng. Rep. 1354 (1835). It was unfortunate that a hurried
and ill-considered conclusion hastily prepared during a
twenty-four hour interval without due deliberation should
destroy, by the application of legal precedent for the next
century, a unique arraugment by which a surety could pro-
mote fulfillment of his principal's obligation and at the same
time protect himself from the hazardous perils of his under-
taking.
The Lord Chancellor's opinion observed that considerable
argument had been raised touching on the conduct of the
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receiver as to the balances of the receivership funds, the
length of time these funds were allowed to remain on deposit,
the slowness with which the receiver paid them over into
court, the making of his yearly accounts, his withdrawals
from the estate of very substantial sums over and above the
necessary outlay, the receipt of funds without placing them
on deposit in the receivership balances, and the fact that even
though White did account once a year for the funds, the mere
act of accounting did not exonerate him from liability for loss.
Touching on the arrangement in question, Lord Chancellor
Brougham pointed out that if a receiver puts a fund out of his
own control so that other persons shall be able to deal with
it, the receiver thereby guarantees the solvency of those
persons and becomes answerable for any loss that may ensue;
however good the intention, the parting with control to the
extent of giving that control to another, is enough to make
him a guarantor of the fund. On the basis of this reasoning,
Lord Chancellor Brougham reversed the judgment of the
Master of the Rolls, holding the receiver and his sureties
liable for the loss of the Salway estate funds occasioned by
bank failures.
The final appeal of the Salway estate case was heard
during the 1835 session of the House of Lords and is reported
as White v. Baugh, 3 Cl. and F. 44, 6 Eng. Rep. 1354, (1835),
a familiar citation that appeared periodically for almost a
hundred years whenever joint control of trust estates came
up for judicial review. One surety, Adams, was then deceased
and receiver White, surety Burlton, and Adams' executor
were the appellants; the respondents were Baugh and one
Beale, as executors of the estate of Richard Salway. Counsel
for the receiver and his sureties founded their arguments on
the basic underlying principles of joint control, also pointing
out that the decision in the High Court of Chancery extended
further than the principle of any former decision wherein if
a receiver deals honestly with the funds entrusted to him,
as a prudent man would deal with his own funds, he should
not be charged with loss beyond his own fault; that a receiver
had always been treated by the courts the same as any other
trustee or agent; that it was necessary for the money to be
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deposited in banks for safe custody and neither the receiver
nor his sureties applied any part of the funds to other than
receivership purposes; and, that the joint control arrange-
ment did not give any advantage to the receiver, nor to his
sureties, beyond that of enabling the sureties to prevent the
receiver from improperly dealing with the trust monies.
The respondents merely echoed the Lord Chancellor's over-
night opinion below: that the arrangement deprived the re-
ceiver of the control which he should have had over the fund
entrusted to his care; that the receiver did not treat the
trust funds as he would have treated his own funds; and, that
no prudent man would leave funds so completely under the
control of a stranger that withdrawal was impossible without
that stranger's consent.
The English appellate procedure permitted the Lord Chan-
cellor to appear before the House of Lords and justify his
own conclusions in the court below. Obviously faced with the
problem of supporting his fortuitous and momei.tary opinion
reversing the Master of the Rolls, Lord Chancellor Brougham
waxed long and eloquent before the House. After stating the
principal issue to be whether or not the joint control arrange-
ment made the receiver and his sureties answerable for the
loss of receivership funds caused by the bank insolvencies
without regard for liability as to the amount of the balance
in each bank when it failed, and without any other neglect or
fault on the part of the receiver, he undertook to establish
that it was clearly the duty of the receiver as an officer of the
court to keep in his own hands the sole control over the funds.
It was admitted, the Lord Chancellor continued, that the re-
ceiver- would be an absolute insurer of the funds if he had
parted altogether with control over them, and it made no
difference that instead of entirely parting with control he
gave veto power over all of his dealings to a stranger, a
business partner of one of the sureties, who was unknown to
the court and over whom the court had no control. Thereafter,
Lord Chancellor Brougham introduced numerous imaginary
possibilities that have been subsequently cited as inherent
evils of the joint control arrangement: the distance between
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the bank depositories and the place of business or residence
of the sureties' joint control agent, the inability of the re-
ceiver to obtain the joint control agent's quick consent to
withdrawal when there is a run on the bank, and the possi-
ble illness or other disability of said agent to act, as well as
his refusal or unwillingness to act. The latter "unwillingness
to act" led to the Chancellor's remote speculation that the
joint control agent could prevent the receiver from joining
a run on the bank to withdraw the trust funds before its
closing, presupposing that the sureties or their agent had
designated their own personal bank as part of the original
agreement, that their interest in said bank was more than
superficial, that they could court the favor of their own
bankers at the risk of the trust estate, that any run on such a
bank would endanger their own safety in it, and that by exer-
cising their veto power over the receiver's withdrawal they
could deter the bank's failure by leaving the receivership
assets in jeopardy. Even that part of the arrangement
whereby the receivership's deposit was in the joint names
of the sureties led to the conjecture that the sureties could
pense of the trust estate.
After thus directing the attention of the House of Lords to
the fact that the arrangement included bank deposits of the
receivership funds in the joint names of the sureties, the Lord
Chancellor proceeded to emphasize that this amounted to a
deposit of the trust funds as collateral security for the pro-
tection of the sureties. The court has a right, he explained,
to security quite independent of the receivership and not
security out of the estate itself. The receiver, he continued,
ought to be a person so honest and of such a character for
honesty as to obtain surety without any such contrivance. No
one would find it hard to obtain surety if the surety is given
control over the funds, and a knave might become a receiver
and obtain sureties on such terms, because he puts into his
sureties' hands the power of preventing the money from going
out of his own. It is enough to say that the court might believe
that a surety had become bound for the good conduct of
another when he had, in fact, given no such pledge nor in-
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curred any risk whatever. This is a deception upon the court,
he said, which is induced to believe that a receiver's honesty
has been vouched for, when it has not.
Lord Chancellor Brougham's concluding remarks before the
House of Lords illustrate the persuasive nature of his argu-
mentative technique. His summarization placed decisive sig-
nificance on the following:
1. That the receiver, White, had deprived himself of
the power of obeying any order that the court might
make respecting the trust fund;
2. That it is far more safe that trust funds not be
hazarded at all, than they be hazarded and the principal
and his surety resorted to in case of loss, on the analogy
that any man had much rather that his money be kept
away from fire than to be told that in case of it being
burned, he may resort to the guarantee or the liability
of a man who is "sporting" with it;
3. That while this arrangement was advantageous to
the receiver in the same degree in which it was detri-
mental to the estate, there was "no kind of necessity"
for the arrangement at all; and
4. That it makes no difference that the veto power
and joint control are not proved to have occasioned
the loss because where a receiver wholly parts with
control of the fund, he becomes answerable for the loss
whether it arises from that cause or not.
The Lord Chancellor's advocacy in the defense of his own
opinion below is probably one of the great classics of English
legal history. Its effect on the House of Lords was magnetic.
The decision in the case of White v. Baugh nf 1835 in the
House of Lords was rendered by Lord Lyndhurst. Although
it seems obvious that their Lordships were carried away by
the eloquence of Lord Chancellor Brougham, Lord Lynd-
hurst's conclusions introduced the new and additional concept
of "irregularity" as the basis for affirming the judgment of
the High Court of Chancery. It would appear that Lord Lynd-
hurst was adversely impressed by what he termed the "en-
tirely irregular" arrangement of "improper dealing with the
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fund by giving sureties control" over it, with that control
"exercised by the hands of a stranger". He pointed out that
a receiver can not be relieved from liability unless his conduct
has been strictly "regular", whether the loss was occasioned
by the "irregularity" of the conduct or not. The depositing of
the receivership money in the bankers' hands subject to this
control, which the receiver had no right to give to other
parties, was an "irregular" proceeding as a result of which
the receiver is not entitled to the indulgence of the court and
the sureties must make good the loss. Considering the opinion
of Lord Lyndhurst in retrospect, it would seem that he seized
upon the terms "irregular" and "irregularity" as a rather
fragile means of support for sustaining Lord Chancellor
Brougham's spectacular defense of his own hurried con-
clusions in the court below. Entirely oblivious to the perils
of the sureties' undertaking, and giving no consideration to
the learned views of Sir John Leach as Master of the Rolls
on the original trial of the case, Lord Lyndhurst confused an
arrangement that was new, singular, and unique, with one
that was "irregular" in the sense that it coincided with all
of the dire speculations put forth by the persuasiveness of
the Lord Chancellor. How could an arrangement for joint
control by the sureties be measured by the ambiguous terms
"regular" or "irregular" when there was then existing no
known yard-stick either in the law of suretyship or trusts
upon which such a dividing line could be drawn? It is sig-
nificant that the later citations to White v. Baugh all point to
the partisan arguments of Lord Chancellor Brougham against
the joint control arrangement, but treat with silence the inde-
cisive reasoning of Lord Lyndhurst upon which the holding
was based. That the captivating oratory of the Lord Chan-
cellor as an adherent of his own lower court opinion should
so becloud the conclusion of the House of Lords was indeed a
most unfortunate outcome, a consequence that was to harass
sureties and multiply the perils of their undertakings for al-
most a century thereafter.
The English cases of Salway v. Salway, supra, and White
v. Baugh, supra, became landmarks in the law governing the
judicial treatment of joint control by a surety. The common
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law doctrine was established by these cases and is perhaps
the same today except in those jurisdictions such as Virginia
where statutory enactments have justified the 'over-ruled
1827 opinion of the Master of the Rolls. Thereafter, courts in
the United States grasped a firm hold on Lord Chancellor
Broughan's compelling dissertations in the House of Lords,
gave his reasoning the "public policy" label, and announced
repeatedly that joint control by the surety was contrary to
public policy.
From the White v. Baugh decision of the English House of
Lords in 1835 until the Georgia opinion of Fidelity and De-
posit Co. v. Butler, 130 Ga. 225, 60 S. E. 851, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.)
994 (1908), there was not a single case involving joint con-
trol by the surety in the sense of an arrangement as it has
come to be known in present day practice. However, the
courts in widely scattered American jurisdictions were build-
ing up a body of common law doctrine in a variety of adjacent
factual situations, with a few decisions favorable to joint
control by the surety but many of them otherwise. Sureties in
most of these cases sought exclusive possession of the trust
assets by way of pledge rather than under a mere joint con-
trol arrangement with the trustee. The skeleton of White v.
Baugh was in every judicial closet, and Lord Chancellor
Brougham's imaginary concepts took on a broader and
broader scope. The excellent reasoning of the Master of the
Rolls in the first Salway decision became obscured by Lord
Chancellor Brougham's hastily-drawn appellate opinion in the
High Court of Chancery and completely obliterated by the
Lord Chancellor's eloquence in the House of Lords. The
equivocal reasoning as to the "regularity" and "irregu-
larity" of the arrangement by Lord Lyndhurst was utterly
effaced during the passage of time by the same preponderant
arguments of the Lord Chancellor, with the extra-ordinary
result that the many later citations to White v. Baugh quote
the impellant language of the latter's disquisition and omit
entirely the abstruse opinion of the House of Lords. The Lord
Chancellor's coinage of the phrase "veto power", with all of
its evil connotations symbolic of authoritative prohibition,
was to reverberate for the next hundred years whenever a
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surety for a fiduciary sought to minimize the perils of his
relationship by a joint control arrangement.
The dominant fact underlying every joint control arrange-
ment from White v. Baugh to the present day is the existence
of doubt as to the fiduciary's reputation and character, his
possible inability to fulfill the obligation, and his probable
lack of financial responsibility to account for any loss that
may be incurred by the trust estate. All too frequently the
courts designate their appointees to positions of trust with-
out thorough investigation of the persons so designated,
thereby shifting the burden of their own responsibility to
the shoulders of the surety. Inability to secure surety informs
the court of its mistake, and a new appointment follows. How-
ever, numerous instances of doubtful qualification proceed
onward through estate administration and subsequent loss,
grave testimonials to the misguided confidence of the surety.
Joint control arrangements are often the decisive element
governing whether or not the fiduciary of questionable com-
petence obtains surety. Successful conclusion of those estates
without loss are more often than not the direct result of the
surety's guiding hand exercised through the medium of joint
control.
It seems obvious that the co-sureties in White v. Baugh
were not entirely satisfied as to the ability and integrity of
the proposed receiver and entered their contract of suretyship
with some hesitance and misgivings. Their unique joint con-
trol arrangement is adequate evidence of the doubtful quali-
fications of their principal. That their concern was not with-
out foundation became obvious some eleven years later when
the claims against the sureties came on for appellate hearing
before the High Court of Chancery. There had been; the Lord
Chancellor wrote in his opinion, "a good deal of argument"
touching the conduct of the receiver in respect to the balances
of funds in his possession, the long delay with which he paid
them into court, the fact that he drew from the estate "very
considerable sums over and above the necessary outlay" and
appeared to have "sometimes received other monies without
putting them into the estate". The fact that the receiver's
mishandling of the funds might have been the proximate
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cause of the loss to the Salway estate, rather than bank
depository insolvency, was sufficient justification by itself for
the joint control arrangement.
Subsequent American cases where joint control or coin-
parable arrangements were made by the surety indicate in
retrospect the fiduciary's uncertain attributes which prompted
the stipulation. The reasonable anticipation of the principal's
insolvency, Poultney v. Randall, 22 N.Y. Super. (9 Bosw.)
232 (1862) or bankruptcy, Forsyth v. Woods, 11 Wall. (78
U.S.) 484, 20 L. ed. 207, (1870) would seem to be ample cause
for a surety to invoke a joint control requirement. Even the
known fact of the principal being heavily in debt is currently
thought to be sufficient cause for the surety to seek some
means of protection. Lee v. Lee, 67 Ala. 406 (1880). Sureties
have long been wary of their loss potential when their fiduci-
ary is on the distaff side, more often than not totally unfa-
miliar with business affairs in general and estate administra-
tion in particular. An early Georgia case is typical of a
situation which usually prompts the modern surety company
to seek joint control before executing its bond.
A female guardian wished to bring suit in behalf of herself
and her children on a life insurance policy covering her late
husband. When question arose as to her ability to give surety
as guardian for her children (as it most always does), an
arrangement was made with a surety whereby the funds,
when and if collected, were to be invested in bonds and those
bonds deposited with the surety as collateral security. Her
attorneys collected the insurance proceeds, but before the
bonds could be purchased, the bank in which the money
was deposited failed. She thereupon brought suit against her
attorneys who had arranged for the surety pursuant to the
collateral security agreement. The trend in judicial thinking
in favor of the surety was illustrated by the court's observa-
tion that the contract to deposit the bonds with the surety was
neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. In distinguishing
the case from Saivay v. Salway, supra, White v. Baugh-, supra,
and Forsyth v. Woods, supra, the court said that this arrange-
ment did not contemplate that the guardianship funds were
to pass into the hands of the surety for his use or control, nor
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did it deprive the guardian of control; that only the invest-
ment securities were to be deposited with the surety, not to
be used by him but kept simply as a guarantee that they would
not be misused by the guardian. The plan was laudable, the
court concluded, and would have afforded double protection
for the wards had the bank failure not intervened; the surety
could not have used the bonds because they would not have
been registered in his name, and the guardian could not have
wasted or squandered them because they were guarded by
the surety. Rogers v. Hopkins and Green, 70 Ga. 454 (1883).
This refreshing opinion was one of the earliest to construe
such an arrangement in the surety's favor.
The great majority of instances where joint control by the
surety has prevented loss of the trust funds by a fiduciary of
questionable character and doubtful repute never reach the
stage of legal dispute and appellate court review, and are
thus unavailable for purposes of justifying the value of the
arrangement. The files of modern corporate surety companies
are replete with cases showing that joint control was the
prime factor in the prevention of loss. Doubtless there are
many similar joint control arrangements by personal or
accommodation sureties which fulfilled the same worthy in-
tent. A few cases which did reach appellate litigation are
deserving of note.
The State Treasurer of Illinois, in consideration of certain
banking officers becoming surety on his official bond, agreed
to deposit the public funds charged to his custody in their
banks for his and their joint benefit, even though such an
arrangement was in possible conflict with an Illinois statute.
Subsequently the State Treasurer defaulted causing tre-
mendous loss of state funds. After payment of the loss by the
sureties, they sought recovery against the insolvent estate of
their deceased principal. The court denied the sureties their
right of indemnification on the grounds that joint control of
the public funds was illegal consideration for the suretyship
contract. Ramsay's Estate v. Whitbeck, 183 Ill. 550, 56 N.E.
322 (1900).
Guardianship estates frequently disclose misapplication or
misappropriation of trust funds, the reasons for which usually
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compel sureties to require joint control. Inherent incapacity,
sometimes even the possibility of sheer dishonesty, are the
underlying causes which promote prior joint control arrange-
ments before the surety undertakes its guaranty of the faith-
ful performance obligation. The arrangement, however suc-
cessful in the control of trust disbursements, sometimes fails
in its purpose because the funds never actually come under
the surety's control. For example, where a guardian deposits
receipts in his own personal account and then dissipates the
money, without any deposits or withdrawals into and from
the guardianship account over which the surety has joint
control, the arrangement has there failed to protect the surety
from loss. U. S. F. & G. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 153
S.W. (2d) 752 (1941). Other recent guardianship cases with
joint control by the surety similarly show that joint control
cannot unfailingly prevent defalcation by an incompetent
guardian whose app intment should never have been effected
by the court. Lloyds Ins. Co. of America v. Moberly, 231 Mo.
App. 920, 82 S.W. (2d) 139, (1935); Wilbur v. Ford, 89 F.
Supp. 407 (1950).
One very significent fact in the White v. Baugh case may
have been controlling in the establishment of a misguided
precedent in the common law. The person who actually exer-
cised the joint control was himself not a surety for the re-
ceiver, but an agent of the sureties, a third person who was,
as Lord Chancellor Brougham so forcefully emphasized, an
absolute stranger to the court. That he was a business partner
of one of the co-sureties was inconsequential in so far as the
legal relationships were concerned since he was still beyond
the jurisdiction of the court. Had either or both of the sureties
themselves exercised the joint control, it is quite possible to
speculate that there would have been no White v. Baugh
doctrine, no long series of cases extending over a period of
a hundred years or more, and no statutes enacted to relieve
sureties of that ancient common law precedent.
It has long been established in the law of trusts, that a
trustee may employ agents for various purposes, but that
any attempt to delegate or surrender the trustee's discretion-
ary duties to an agent amounts to a wrongful act. Where a
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loss follows such a delegation to an agent, notwithstanding
good faith and reasonable care, the trustee is held to be an
absolute insurer of the loss. Thus where a private trustee
surrenders management of the trust to a corporate trust com-
pany without authorization to do so by the court, the private
trustee becomes a guarantor for any loss whatever, regardless
of whether or not the agent's acts were the proximate cause.
Meck v. Behrens, 141 'Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91, 50 A.L.R. 207
(1927).
It is indeed curious that not a single case involving joint
control by an agent of the surety appears in the English and
American reports after the White v. Baugh decision of 1835.
Although cited so frequently as common law precedent, it
was rare that any court undertook to distinguish the fact
of joint control by a surety's agent as distinctly different
from similar control in the hands of the surety. Of course,
modern joint control by corporate surety companies is exer-
cised entirely through their agents, but the doctrine of White
v. Baugh seems never to have arisen to promote its defeat
on the agency grounds. It is, of course, obvious that unless
exercised through agents, the whole program of joint control
in corporate suretyship would be a practical impossibility.
The "veto power" by which Lord Chancellor Brougham
stigmatized the sureties' joint control in Wiite v. Baugh came
down through the pathways of judicial history as an ignomini-
ous arrangement contradicting the very foundations of public
policy. Countersignature of drafts was then uncommon, if not
unknown, and any such an arrangement seemed utterly re-
pugnant to his Lordship. Subsequent American jurists over-
looked the vast developments in commerical procedure since
the time of White v. Baugh, among which the practice of
countersignature was a major step forward. In 1898 the
United States Supreme Court adopted the rule requiring
trustees in bankruptcy to deposit estate funds in an approved
depository subject to the countersignature of the court or its
referee. General Orders in Bankruptcy, Rule XXIX (1898).
Modern business corporations have, since the turn of the
century, established countersignature as standard internal
procedure for the disbursement of funds. The same dual
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control is extended to the deposit or withdrawal of securities,
and other modern accounting methods require as many types
of restraint on the handling of cash and securities as the
ingenuity of auditors can devise. Although it is often said
that our jurisprudence keeps pace with the times, taking note
of past experience and present custom in the light of changing
conditions, the progress of commercial enterprise became lost
in the fog of the White v. Baugh doctrine in its application to
trust administration. The predominating influence of stare
decisis and the reluctance of the courts to change what they
believed to be a matter of public policy left the process of joint
control by the surety in the doldrums of judicial antiquity,
subject only to whatever statutory modifications the various
legislatures might see fit to enact.
The tendency to hold that joint control of trust funds by
the surety is both illegal and contrary to public policy, thereby
finding the trustee and surety jointly and severally liable for
any loss of funds regardless of fault, is no better illustrated
than by the famous case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Butler,
supra. in 1908. Until statutes amended the White v. Baugh
doctrine in a particular jurisdiction, the case was cited by
every court considering the problem of joint control or any
of its analogous arrangements. When a guardian of minor
children was appointed and gave surety, it was agreed with
the surety that the estate funds would be deposited in a
specified bank approved by the surety and that no part of
the funds should be withdrawn without joint signatures of
the guardian and the surety. This arrangement was consum-
mated with the full knowledge and agreement of the chosen
bank. When the bank closed its doors, the guardian filed his
claim with the bank's receiver who paid out liquidating
dividends direct to the guardian without the surety's counter-
signatures. The guardian dissipated these dividends, claim
was made against the surety, reduced to judgment, and paid.
The surety then brought suit against the bank's receiver for
breach of the bank's duty under the joint control agreement,
seeking recovery of the loss. There was judgment against the
surety in favor of the bank's receiver in the trial court and
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the surety appealed. The appellate opinion put the "contrary
to public policy" label on the joint control arrangement.
The court traced the long history of the subject starting
with the Salway estate cases and WAite v. Baugh, pointing
out that there the fiduciary was a receiver, an official of the
court; that the deposits were in the sole name of the sureties;
and that the person there exercising the control was not a
surety but a stranger to the receivership. However, acknowl-
edging these differences from the instant case, the court found
the same reasoning applicable and cited with approval many
of the earlier American cases even though none of them were
exactly in point. Its garbled interpretation of the joint control
arrangement led it to emphasize that the law does not provide
for turning over control of the estate to the surety in order to
"idemnify" the surety against loss out of the assets of the
estate. Thus retreating behind the nostalgic words of Lord
Chancellor Brougham, the court found that such a veto power
in the surety was contrary to public policy.
This was one of the earliest cases where joint control had
been perfected by a corporate surety company and the court
stressed its inability to find the arrangement legal for cor-
porate sureties but contrary to public policy as to individual
citizens who become personal sureties. Commenting that
care and caution must be used in the interpretation of any
contract as against public policy, it observed that such joint
control agreements might possibly be needed for protection
of estate beneficiaries against knaves who would, as fiduci-
aries, plunder the weak and helpless. But, the court concluded,
such safeguards as joint control by the surety remained for
the legislatures, not the courts, to establish. Three years
later the Supreme Court of California reached the same con-
clusion on somewhat similar facts, also suggesting legislative
relief. In re Wood's Estate, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992, 36
L.R.A. (N.S.)252 (1911).
It is interesting to compare four different decisions handed
down within the span of four years by the Supreme Court
of one state, Alabama, more than a decade before joint control
became established public policy by act of its legislature.
274 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES
The first case in 1932 involved a guardianship, joint control
by the surety and subsequent failure of the bank depository.
An added fact gave support to the White v. Baugh doctrine
in that the estate funds were continued on deposit in the bank
which later failed, over the repeated protest of the guardian,
because the surety's joint control representative had refused
to permit prior transfer of the funds to a larger city bank.
Bates v. Jones, 224 Ala. 82, 139 So. 242 (1932). The surety,
through its own stupidity, had thus in this case by its own
act encouraged the court to cite Lord Chancellor Brougham's
original doctrine (as well as all the subsequent cases over the
period of a hundred years), and to glorify the wisdom of that
rule. Three years later in 1935 the same court decided two
cases exactly opposite, in favor of the surety. In one of these
concerning a guardianship, joint control by the surety, and
bank failure, its majority and minority opinions both dealt
entirely with probate procedure and remained quite silent as
to the joint control arrangement and applicable public policy.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Holmes, 230 Ala. 332, 160 So. 178
(1935). The third case involving the administrator of a dece-
dent's estate with the surety's joint control and later bank
failure, cited the 1932 case and all of the prior judicial prece-
dent, yet concluded that "so long as the surety keeps aloof
from the conduct of the trust whose faithful administration
he has guaranteed, and seeks no profit from it to himself, he
may stand on the letter of his bond and escape liability accord-
ing to its tenor." Boutwell v. Drinkard, 230 Ala. 212, 160 So.
349 (1935). Yet, the following year, the same court reversed
itself again, holding an administrator and his surety equally
liable for bank failure loss because of the joint control agree-
ment. Ex parte Moore, 164 So. 210, also Moore v. Easlinger,
232 Ala. 251, 167 So. 328 (1936).
What was the result where there was an agreement for
joint control by the surety but the joint control had neither
been perfected nor exercised? This interesting sidelight
came up where an administrator was appointed and gave
bond, signing the surety company's application in which he
covenanted and agreed to the exercise of joint control. No
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fulfillment of the joint control agreement had been reached
when the bank failed with substantial loss to the estate.
Relying on the unperfected joint control agreement, the heirs
of the estate sought to charge the administrator and his
surety with the banking loss under the doctrine of White v.
Baugh. The court's conclusion was obviously projected
from its dislike for the plaintiff's century-old argument.
Finding it unnecessary to determine the correctness of that
rule, it held that the surety had waived its right to joint
control for which it had contracted, and that the mere
existence of the agreement with joint control never exercised
or availed by the surety, could have no effect to render the
principal and his surety liable as guarantors or absolute
insurers. Obviously, the bare agreement for joint control,
per se, was not contrary to public policy. Jones v. O'Brien,
58 S. D. 213, 235 N. W. 654 (1931).
The unhappy status of joint control and public policy prior
to statutory reversal of the White v. Baugh doctrine was per-
haps best expressed by Judge Chittenden in an opinion of
the Probate Court of Lucas County, Ohio, in 1936. In re
Guardianship of George J. Coddington, 5 Ohio Opin. 593
(1936). The Veteran's Administration had brought an action
against the guardian of an incompetent, seeking to charge the
guardian as guarantor and hold him liable for the loss of
estate funds which were on deposit when the bank depository
closed its doors. Joint control had been arranged and exer-
cised by a corporate surety. The undisputed facts found
by the court were that the funds had been properly deposited
to the credit of the guardian, that the surety in no way had
control over the estate administration, and that nbither the
guardian nor his surety were remotely responsible for the
loss. Yet, after expressing its keen disapproval for the exist-
ing law which had been blindly followed for a century, the
court found itself regretfully bound by the weight of author-
ity, and held for the plaintiffs. The opinion, notwithstanding
its adverse holding, contained a gem of modern judicial
thinking:
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Although the doctrine of White v. Baugh has been uni-
formly followed in the United States, the wisdom of the
application of this arbitrary rule, over one hundred years
old, to the modern practice of surety companies in re-
quiring joint control over bank deposits, may be seri-
ously questioned. The use of surety companies as surety
on fiduciary bonds is highly desirable and it is the com-
mon practice for such companies to require joint con-
trol. Such control in no way operates as control over or
direction of the administration of the trust.... Inexperi-
enced persons are entitled to be appointed as fiduciaries
of estates. The whole purpose of the law is to safeguard
trust funds. Such joint control over bank deposits only
affords an additional safeguard over those funds.
The court had obviously been influenced by a well-known
text (2 Woerner, American Law of Administration 853, 3d ed.,
1923.) and its own lengthy review of the American cases all
adhesively following the English common law rule. The
court's conclusion was a mandate to the Ohio legislature:
. . . In view of the manifest advantage derived from
the practice of joint control over bank accounts, we urge
that this subject be given legislative attention.
A few states had enacted statutes late in the nineteenth
century, among them being Kentucky where an early 1893
legislative act established joint control as legally permissive.
The Kentucky provision was then amended and strengthened
in 1922 in which context arose the strange and involved case
of Foley's Administrator v. Roberts.on's Guardian, 215 Ky.
647, 286 S.W. 851 (1926). Looking back at the case, it
stands out as a masterpiece of legal blunder. Apparently
so overcome by the White v. Baugh doctrine and the prece-
dent it established for all the subsequent American cases,
counsel and court alike completely overlooked their own Ken-
tucky statute which lay hidden away in the state code waiting
to be tapped for its authoritative value. Indeed, the acme of
judicial stupidity (or perhaps sheer laziness) appears in the
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court's observation that there was "no joint control statute
in Kentucky."
A guardian of minor children had substituted surety, from
personal to corporate, with the prior personal surety dis-
charged. Both the prior personal surety and the successor
corporate surety exercised joint control pursuant to agree-
ment with the guardian. Coincident with the substitution
of surety, the guardianship funds were transferred to a new
bank whose cashier was joint control agent for the new
corporate surety. Disaster then overtook the guardianship:
the guardian was removed from office for cause, the bank
building burned down from which conflagration its insolvency
was disclosed, the remaining guardianship assets in the bank
were lost, the bank's cashier who was the surety company's
joint control agent was convicted for embezzlement of the
bank's assets and sentenced to the penitentiary, and the ex-
guardian died insolvent. The action was brought by the
newly appointed guardian against the insolvent estate of the
deceased ex-guardian, his substituted corporate surety, and
his prior personal surety. The court, obviously enchanted
by the facts, seized upon the surety's joint control as the most
simple avenue upon which to approach the only remaining
source of replenishment for the estate-the resources of the
sureties. Its opinion had the familiar White v. Baugh touch:
The knot presented by this record may be easily untied
if we first loosen it by determining the effect of the sure-
ties' joint control on the respective obligations to the
estate beneficiaries. There is no joint control statute in
Kentucky. Thus if the guardian by private arrangement
yields in any measure to any one his sole contrbl of such
estate, he becomes an absolute insurer of the estate
assets. (Emphasis added.)
Then, after citations to White v. Baigh and many of the lead-
ing American cases following its doctrine, the court con-
cluded:
Further, the fiduciary should at all times have it within
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his power and discretion to immediately withdraw the
assets of the estate from the depository without the pos-
sibility of any veto power being exercised upon such
action on his part and without the necessity of under-
going the delay which may be caused by his effort to
secure the assent of the surety.... In this case the assets
of the estate were withdrawn from a bank then solvent
and still solvent, and placed in an insolvent bank under
the joint control of the surety whose agent later turned
out to be a defaulter.
It was clear that the deceased ex-guardian, although in-
solvent upon his death, had not defaulted; yet his surety
was charged with the loss. While the surety's agent had
indeed embezzled from the bank depository, he had not
defaulted as to the guardianship and the loss should have
been absorbed by the bank through and under its own surety
bond on the cashier, and not by the guardian's surety. The
"lost" Kentucky statute dating back to 1893, which would
have changed the whole complexion of this case if it had been
introduced, read in part as follows:
And in case where any such [surety] company may be
accepted as such surety, it shall be lawful for the court
or officer taking the bond, or for any officer or fiduciary
for whom the said company shall become surety, to place
any bonds, stocks, securities or valuables in the custody
of such company for safe keeping. Kentucky Revised
Statutes, Amended 1922, §687.
Thirteen years later when another Kentucky plaintiff sought
to rely on this case, the statute was removed from the closet
in favor of the surety and the court then made the rudi-
mentary observation that the Foley case might have been
decided differently if this statute had been cited to the court.
Fidelity and Casualty Co, v. Pippin, 124 S.W. 2d 62 (1939).
The change in public policy in Kentucky was a long -me in
transit, even by way of statute.
If it can be said that public policy is reflected by legisla-
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tive performance, the adverse public policy surrounding joint
control by the surety has been reversed to a large extent in
the United States. The earliest statute seems to have been
enacted in Maryland in 1798, but at the turn of the succeed-
ing century only several of the states (New York in 1885,
Michigan in 1895, New Jersey in 1902) had made any effort
to abrogate the ancient common law doctrine of 'White v.
Baugh. About 1936 the Committee on Fidelity and Surety
Law of the Insurance Section, American Bar Association,
after a study of joint control by the surety in trust estates,
recommended the adoption of a uniform joint control statute
in every state. The model act which they suggested was clear
and concise, reading as follows:
It shall be lawful for any party of whom a bond, under-
taking or other obligation is required, to agree with his
surety or sureties for the deposit of any or all moneys
and assets for which he and his surety or sureties are
or may be held responsible, with a bank, savings bank,
safe-deposit or trust company, authorized by law to do
business as such, or with other depository approved by
the court or a judge thereof, if such deposit is otherwise
proper, for the safekeeping thereof, and in such manner
as to prevent the withdrawal of such money or assets or
any part thereof, without the written consent of such
surety or sureties, or an order of court, or a judge thereof
made on such notice to such surety or sureties as such
court or judge may direct; provided, however, that such
agreement shall not in any manner release from or
change. the liability of the principal or sureties as estab-
lished by the terms of the said bond.-
This ac- was intended to constitute an affirmative declaration
of,'public policy, to preserve the exclusive- jursdiction of the
court over the disposition of trust and.etate funds, and to
relieve jqint control sureties for fiduciaries from the .perils
of bank depository failure. By its enactment, inA& statute,
the "contrary to public policy" argument becomes.a relic of
the era.in which the White V wBagh doctrine "was bor ;by
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its provision that the court may order withdrawal of the
funds without the surety's consent (on mere discretionary
notice to the surety) the court's power to regulate trust and
estate activities is not impaired; and, by its closing phrase
confining the liability of both principal and surety strictly
within the terms of the suretyship instrument, joint control
cannot be made the basis for establishing "liability without
fault" leading to responsibility for loss from bank failures
and other such disconnected contingencies of trust and estate
administration.
The model act has now become statutory law in twenty
states (including Virginia) and substantially similar statutes
are in force in about thirteen other states The abbreviated
joint control statute of Delaware and the ambiguous statute
intended to serve the same purpose in Illinois, will undoubt-
edly require judicial clarification at some future date, unless
improved by amendment or re-enactment. New Jersey's
statute of 1902 is of early vintage and might well be modern-
ized in keeping with the suggested uniform law. Three states
(Kansas, North Carolina, and Vermont) have no joint control
statutes as such, but certain provisions of their codified laws
indicate that public policy now favors joint control by the
surety. In North Carolina, judicial interpretation has already
affirmed this possibility. Pierce v. Pierce, (97 N.C. 348, 148
S.E. 438 (1929), Le.onard v. York, 202 N.C. 704, 163 S.E.
878 (1932). In Minnesota, the District of Columbia, and
Hawaii, existing statutory law is silent as to joint control
by a surety but contains provisions by which a surety might
be legally enabled to exercise joint control without too serious
a contravention of public policy. Only in West Virgina does
a statute, and there by implication only, prohibit a surety
company from exercising joint control. The remaining seven
states and territories have neither positive law nor case
precedent, and it remains to be determined whether or not
they will adhere to the White v. Baugh doctrine or join the
modern trend.
There has not been very extensive litigation under any of
these joint control statutes and comparatively few decisions
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appear in the reports. The earliest such case determined
that the Michigan statute of 1895 was not appliable to joint
control over public funds by a surety for a public official.
Steel v. Auditor General, 111 Mich. 381 (1896). The same
Michigan statute later was the obvious medium of relief for
a surety whose guardian had lost his estate's funds by failure
of the bank depository. In re French's Estate, 267 Mich. 168
(1934). An early New York case, involving testamentary
trustees, examined the court's jurisdiction to order a dis-
bursement of funds under the surety's joint control (an aspect
specifically contained in the Virgina act), and held that under
the New York joint control statute it could do so providing
due notice was given to the surety. In re Chesterman's
Estate, 75 App. Div. 573, 78 N.Y. Supp. 345 (1902). The joint
control statute in California has also passed judicial review
with results quite favorable to its validity. In re Estate of
Alea K. Ounjuian, 4 -Calif. (2d) 659, 52 P. (2d) 220, 102
A.L.R. 1106 (1935).
The laws of three states (North Carolina, Kansas, and
Vermont) do not in positive terms vitiate the early common
law doctrine. However, those states as part of their regula-
tory law for corporate surety companies, fix a maximum
amount of liability a surety company may expose itself to on
any single bond of suretyship. The statutes in each of these
three states then permit that limitation to be exceeded where
the surety company exercises joint control on a fiduciary's
surety bond, under certain prescribed conditions and further
limitations. Although there have been no cases in Kansas
or Vermont, the statute in North Carolina has twice been
judicially construed in a way that would indicate that joint
control by the surety in North Carolina is now established
public policy. Where guardianship funds under the surety's
joint control were lost by bank failure, North Carolina's
highest court concluded without mention of the existing
statute, that the principal and surety were not liable for
the loss so long as the guardian exercised good faith and
due diligence in the handling of the estate. Pierce v. Pierce,
supra. Three years later the same court pronounced this
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statute to be a rescission of the common law doctrine by act
of the state's general assembly. Leonard v. York, supra.
Where there has been no case precedent established with
respect to joint control in a particular state and a statute
is then enacted, does the statute as enacted in Virginia reverse
existing public policy against joint control, or does it affirm
what may be termed a prior public policy favoring such an
arrangement between fiduciary and surety? The most recent
case dealing with the surety's joint control raised this
question. Wilbur v. Ford, 89 F. Supp. 407 (1950). It was
a suit against guardian and surety for alleged misappropria-
tions by the guardian. The guardianship arose in the state
of Mlaine but was in the Massachusetts federal court on
diversity of citizenship. By a motion for summary judgment
against the surety on the grounds that its exercise of joint
control of the funds in the hands of the guardian made it a
joint tort-feasor, the plaintiff sought to recover only from
the surety. Both Maine and Massachusetts had joint control
statutes but there were no prior cases favoring or rejecting
the common law doctrine in either state. The court denied
the motion with this reasoning:
Plaintiff's argument requires that there be a law which
holds a surety liable as a joint tort-feasor solely as the
result of exercising joint control with the guardian, re-
gardless of the surety's lack of knowledge of or benefit
from the guardian's defalcation. There is no such law in
Maine . . . (citing the Maine and Massachusetts joint
control statutes) ... Before the Maine statute which ex-
plictly legalized joint control entered into by guardians
and sureties, there existed no common law in Maine on
the question. On these facts, the common law of Maine
must be presumed the same as that of Masachusetts, the
state of the forum. There being no judicial decision in
Massachusetts prior to the statute, our holding is that
the common law in Massachusetts is the same as stated
in the statute. . . . Therefore, there is no law according
to which plaintiff can recover direct from the surety
under the facts in this case.
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Thus, if the common law without case precedent is the same
as later codified by joint control statute, the earlier common
law doctrine has finally vanished from the forum of American
jurisprudence. This case could well be the foundation of a
new precedent for joint control in a few states and the
District of Columbia still lacking affirmative joint control
legislation.
The Virginia joint control statute, Va. Code Ann. §38.1-645
(1950), therefore marks a significant development in the ad-
ministration of trusts and estates. Without Virgina case
precedent prior to its enactment, it is quite impossible to
determine whether it affirms or repudiates the common law
of Virginia applicable to joint control by the surety. However,
it does affirmatively extinguish the English common law
doctrine White v. Baugh and places the Virgina law on a par
with the majority of the American states. Although it has
not yet been subjected to judicial application or construction,
tbore is every reason to believe that it will meet the test, if and
when it comes, and that it will be construed the same as its
companion statutes have been construed in other states. It is
this statute which would enable the surety on the bond of
Adolph Oberweiss, executor, to fulfill the mandate of his
testator; it is within the scope of this statute, had the will
of Herman Oberweiss been admitted to probate in Virginia,
that the court would have been enabled to order joint control
by the surety, thus making it possible to "watch him like hell"
as the testator had directed and intended when he designated
his brother Adolph as his executor.

